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Abstract 
There has been considerable scepticism in Europe over the reliability of 
Russia as a secure source of energy for the EU. Despite Russia and EU being 
economically interdependent with regard to energy and other trade, there is still 
concern over potential supply disruptions. What can be gathered from media and 
scholarly sources is that Russia is potentially an unreliable supplier yet it is 
currently the only alternative for the EU, for especially natural gas. Russia may 
not be a secure source of energy, however it is important to keep in mind that 
most concerns have arisen from Russian behaviour in what it deems the ‘near 
abroad’. European relations with Russia are not comparable to those between 
Moscow and the CIS. The true danger in relying on Russia for energy security 
stems from the impending investment crisis in the energy industry. This is to a 
large extent related to the excessive state control of the energy sector. At the risk 
of engendering ill will in Russian-European affairs, it is important for the EU to 
try and diversify away from Russian energy supplies. That said, energy fuelled 
Russian power games aimed at the Union seem to be fairly unlikely for the time 
being.  
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 4 
1 Introduction 
Energy security has been a contentious issue for decades as a result of a 
tumultuous relationship between producers and consumers of energy.  
Energy is a commodity that the modern world is unable to do without, 
therefore an increasing number of countries are becoming ever more 
dependent upon energy producers. However, one must keep in mind there 
are two sides to a coin, and producers are as dependent on the security of 
demand as consumers are on the security of supply. For many producer 
countries, energy sales represent the lion’s share of export income.  
 A general definition of energy security is the availability of 
sufficient supplies at affordable prices, yet for different countries it means 
different things. For energy-exporting countries it is a focus on 
maintaining security of demand, for Russia it is the aim to reassert state 
control over strategic resources and gain primacy over main pipelines and 
market channels, yet for Europe the debate centres on how to manage 
dependence upon imported natural gas1. To address the issue of energy 
security between EU and Russia, it is important to balance and analyse 
the two contrasting viewpoints. 
 This paper aims to shed some light upon the issue of energy 
security between Russia and the EU. Russia is the biggest energy 
producer on the European continent. Russia should be the natural and 
primary source of energy for the EU, and as it stands, it is playing an 
increasing role in supplying the union with much needed energy supplies. 
In future the amount of energy consumed, and thereby also volumes of 
purchased energy is predicted to rise significantly. Moreover, Russia 
looks poised to enhance its share of the EU’s total energy imports. 
However, there are certain question marks that have to be addressed 
within this relationship to try and determine whether Russia is a secure 
source. 
 Firstly, this paper will be taking into consideration certain 
theoretical aspects of interdependence to underline the true economic 
nature of the energy relationship. The EU and Russia are dependent upon 
each other for respectively a secure source of supply and demand. 
However this mutual dependence is not sufficient to determine the energy 
relationship secure, as interdependence is possible in a milieu of political 
volatility. There are certain extant political conditions that are present in 
Russia, and in other producer countries that threaten energy security, such 
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as lack of transparency and democracy. However, despite the presence of 
such problems, the EU and Russia are highly dependent upon each other 
for trade, especially in the field of energy. This is particularly true for 
Eastern Europe, which brings to forefront the concluding discussion for 
this section where some of the possibilities for lowering dependence will 
be highlighted. Some of the main questions addressed in this section are 
as follows; to what extent is trade mutually dependent? How sensitive and 
vulnerable is interdependence? And how can the EU lower dependence 
upon Russia? 
 In the second section there will be a discussion underlining some 
of the problems with which the Russia-EU energy trade relationship is 
faced. This is an important conduit through which to analyse the state of 
affairs, as these problems contribute to insecurity in the energy 
relationship. The main issues that will be considered in the area are 
problems that Russia may face with future energy supply and questions of 
trust between the EU and Russia. This is especially important with regard 
to the fact that member states do not act unanimously toward Russia, but 
have rather built bilateral ties which are more secure between some 
members than others. This is highly problematic for inter-EU relations, as 
it leads to a fractured consensus regarding potential responses to Russian 
pressures backed by energy power. 
 The third section aims to outline the risks that Russia would be 
taking if it decided to ‘misbehave’ toward the EU with the energy supply, 
such as intentional energy supply disruptions as was seen in Ukraine 
January 2006. This analysis will be taking into account both the political 
as well as the economic considerations. In some respect the economic, in 
this instance largely technical arguments, will bear potentially greater 
weight as there is and has been an understanding that no matter the 
politics, in most cases regarding energy, “as long as there is money, it will 
continue to change hands, and energy will continue to move across 
borders”2. It is important to establish why it is unviable for Russia to turn 
toward emerging Asian energy markets, at the same time as asking what 
opportunities might Russia take to undermine European energy security? 
 The final section is designed to briefly analyse the role of the 
Kremlin in the question of energy security, with special emphasis on who 
sets the agenda. What role has the change in leadership from Yeltsin to 
Putin played? This appears to play a rather large role when judging the 
shape of the energy industry under the two leaders. Here the dominant 
issues are the contemporary investment climate as well as the domestic 
situation with regard to social well being.   
 From a methodological perspective, research for this topic has 
been conducted largely on journal and article basis, as well as original 
interview and energy information sources. The author has aimed to have 
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put forward an objective analysis of the energy security issues between 
EU and Russia, while creating plausible scenarios to determine how 
secure of a source of energy Russia is.  
 7 
2 An Interdependent Relationship? 
 
Interdependence is an incredibly important aspect of modern day politics 
as a result of the fundamental changes that have taken place in the world 
over the past century. The first half was characterised by a strong 
emphasis on ‘national security’ politics, however as the century began 
drawing to its close, innate changes had transpired. The 1980s and 1990s 
saw transformations and developments that were to change world politics 
for good, such as the colossal growth of the banking sector, the 
development of communication technology such as internet, and the end 
of the Cold War, to mention a few.  
 As a result of the above-mentioned developments, states became 
increasingly dependent upon one another. Another important factor that 
further increased this effect was the growing energy dependence in 
industrialised countries that occurred alongside technological applications 
becoming an ever more important part of general public consumption. 
The subsequent effect has been the gradual evolution of less developed 
countries which have now become increasingly large energy consumers, 
such as China and India. In general terms these processes have led to 
exponential growth in worldwide energy demand in the world, where 
even the most advanced and powerful states become dependent upon 
producer countries, as the most developed countries happen to have 
supplies incapable of meeting their voracious demands. 
 In order to conduct a deeper discussion on the topic of 
interdependence, it must initially be defined. Interdependence is mutual 
dependence resulting from international transactions; flows of money, 
goods, people and messages across international boundaries3. 
Interdependence applies to situations where countries are engaged in trade 
of essential goods rather than luxury goods. For instance, fur importing 
countries are not as dependent on a continual supply of fur as are oil 
importing countries on the constant flow of oil. When there are reciprocal 
costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. However, in cases 
where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply 
interconnectedness. We have to also keep in mind that interdependence 
does not only apply to mutual benefit, but also situations such as the 
strategic interdependence between the former Soviet Union and the USA.  
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 Two more aspects need to be taken into account when analysing 
the theoretical base for interdependence. These are sensitivity of 
interdependence and vulnerability. The former applies to the degree of 
responsiveness within a policy framework, meaning; ‘how quickly do 
changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are 
the costly effects?’4 Vulnerability rests upon the relative availability and 
costliness of alternatives that various actors face. “In terms of cost of 
dependence, sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from 
outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. 
Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed 
by external events after policies are altered”.5 
  
2.1 EU-Russia vulnerability and sensitivity 
 Having defined the basic assumptions behind interdependence, it 
is important to establish how sensitive and vulnerable the EU and Russia 
are in their trade relationship. When looking at trade figures, from 
Russia’s point of view the EU is its biggest trade partner, bringing in 
highest revenues. Statistics elucidate that EU import patterns from Russia 
are dominated by energy imports. Statistically speaking, between 2001 
and 2005 energy imports covered by far the largest share of imports from 
Russia to the EU. This can be seen in figure 16 below.  
 
Figure 1 : Russian export pattern to EU 
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When looking at total imports of gas to the EU, then Russia provides 50 
percent, which can be seen below in figure 27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, trade with Russia is growing significantly from all aspects, and 
most importantly the EU is Russia’s main trading partner, accounting for 
52% of Russia’s overall trade8. 
 What can be gathered from this information is the fact that firstly, 
energy trade is the main export from Russia to the EU, which in terms of 
only gas adds up to 50% of the bloc’s total imports. Secondly, Russia is 
dependent upon the EU for 52% of its overall trade, which would indicate 
concentrated dependence upon one market. What can be concluded from 
this in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependence is the fact 
that both the EU, in terms of energy imports, and Russia are quite 
sensitive when judging the import patterns. This implies that if there were 
sudden disruptions in energy supply, there would be considerable costly 
effects on the European market. For Russia, disruption in trade from the 
EU would likewise result in considerable costly effects, which would not 
be in Russia’s interests. This is an indication that there is considerable 
sensitivity in interdependence between the two. When judging 
vulnerability, then one can assume that the EU would encounter 
considerable costs when attempting to handle the supply disruptions, as 
there are few alternatives to be relied upon for such a substantial energy 
contribution. 
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 From a theoretical perspective there are several factors that can be 
seen as symptoms of vulnerability; a scarcity of domestic resources, lack 
of known substitutes, few producers, a sole supplier, few foreign 
suppliers, foreign resources situated far away, hostile ideologies at foreign 
supplier countries, low potential for recycling, and foreign trade 
limitations9. When looking at the abovementioned factors, many 
characterise the EU’s energy situation. There are indeed few large 
producers, exacerbated by the fact that nearly all of them happen to be 
ruled by unstable governments. Russia is situated closer than other 
suppliers, there is a lack of domestic resources and there is indeed a lack 
of possibility of recycling energy as well as a lack of alternative sources 
of energy. However, the possibility of increasing nuclear power’s share in 
energy supplies has been mooted, as Russia is seen as unreliable in face of 
growing European demand. 
 The EU would suffer mostly in terms of gas imports as gas is 
currently sourced through pipelines, which implies that gas needs to be 
transported from a somewhat nearby country. However, this problem 
could be solved in future with the development of and wider use of Liquid 
Natural Gas (LNG) which can be transported by sea. This technology will 
however take time and significant funds to develop.  
 The problem of energy dependence is particularly relevant to 
Eastern Europe, which imports most of its energy from Russia. The Baltic 
states are highly dependent as is Poland, and this dependence has also 
proven to be rather problematic, as Russia has been known to pressure the 
countries using the threat of supply disruptions. For example, in 2005 
Russia announced to Kazakhstan that it would not be permitted to supply 
oil through Russian pipelines to Lithuania’s Mazeikai Refinery as a result 
of Russian attempts to stop the sale of the refinery to foreign companies10. 
These exercises of power are a cause for concern for the future as the rest 
of Europe becomes increasingly dependent. One will begin to question 
whether Russia will be equally ruthless toward old members as they are to 
new, or whether this situation is a result of lingering post-Soviet tensions 
with Eastern Europe?  
 From a Russian point of view, it is hard to tell based upon these 
figures how vulnerable it is. As the EU exports such a wide variety of 
goods; machinery, manufactured goods, chemicals, transport equipment 
and food and live animals11, it is difficult to say to where and in what time 
span Russia would be able to shift its imports. However, one can assume 
that it would take considerable time, as EU imports make up such a 
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substantial percentage of total imports as to imply that Russia is also 
vulnerable. It is possible to continue to discuss which of the partners has a 
comparative advantage, however this author has not deemed it necessary 
to further develop this point.  
 To draw this subsection to a close, it is important to mention one 
final point. Imports of Russian energy are predicted to grow significantly 
in the future due to a number of factors. Firstly, consumption of energy 
within the EU is predicted to rise, despite the fact that industry is 
continually being made more energy efficient, and there is continual 
research conducted to develop alternative energy sources. Secondly, 
imports of natural gas are predicted to grow in future in Europe, 
especially with the start-up of the anticipated NordStream pipeline which 
is to be built between Russia and Germany. This pipeline would push 
Germany’s gas dependence on Russia to over 50%12.  
 The EU has been very closely monitoring the situation around the 
Caspian Sea, and the disputes over who owns what parts of it, in order to 
guarantee its own energy security. Statistically speaking, EU’s energy 
import dependence on Russia is projected to grow to 68% by 2030. This 
is a cause for concern for the EU due to Russian instability, especially 
with regard to recent riots in Estonia where Russia is rumoured to have 
rerouted 85%13 of transit through other countries due to the move of the 
Bronze solider. This most certainly raises questions of energy security to 
the EU if disputes were to arise, and could provide impetus for the EU to 
attempt to diversify suppliers and to keep a close eye on the Caspian Sea, 
under which lies a considerable energy source.  
 
2.2 Energy security threats and the need to 
 lower dependence 
 In the above section the criteria for vulnerability were mentioned, 
and they are synonymous with threats to energy security. To quickly 
remention them; a scarcity of domestic resources, lack of known 
substitutes, few producers, a sole supplier, few foreign suppliers, foreign 
resources situated far away, hostile ideologies at foreign supplier 
countries, low potential for recycling, and foreign trade limitations14. 
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These are the theoretical criteria, and incidentally Russia happens to fulfil 
a large number of them. There is a limited availability for alternative 
reliable suppliers. The current situation in the world is that most large 
energy suppliers are ruled by unstable governments, and Russia happens 
to be one of the large suppliers deemed to be one of the less dangerous 
ones. Russia is also not a member of OPEC which makes it an attractive 
alternative to many other suppliers.  
 However despite the fact that Russia is considered one of the less 
dangerous suppliers, it is still a problem for the EU to continue to depend 
upon Russia to such a large extent, and in future to do so significantly 
more. Ideally, the EU should lower its dependence upon Russia in order 
to try and guarantee its energy security. The more diversified the supply 
is, the safer in energy terms. From a theoretical point of view, there are a 
number of methods which would help lower dependence; substitution, use 
of alternative sources, developing their own resources, new projects for 
exploration of resources, recycling, storage, newly designed products, 
changes in environmental restrictions, investment and tax incentives, 
special trade agreements and military means15. When looking at the 
criteria, there are several that are relevant to the EU. Firstly, it is not 
feasible for the EU to find alternative suppliers, especially for gas, as they 
are either too far away or highly unstable. With regard to the different tax 
incentives, there is not a lack of investment within the EU, the main 
problem is the fact that there is an inherent lack subsoil energy resources 
on EU territory. There are some resources in the Netherlands, Italy, the 
UK (the Atlantic), but the problem is that none of these are substantial 
enough to fill the energy demand in the EU. The EU is forced to import a 
total of 80% of oil supplies, due to a domestic lack of resources16. 
 Recycling and storage are not useful options either as fossil fuels 
do not present any significant recycling possibilities, and storage is not a 
viable option due to the quantities that have to be stored in order to make 
it feasible. Finally, when looking at alternative energy sources, it is not 
currently possible to substitute fossil fuels for alternatives. Nuclear power 
is currently the only option, however it is not popular due to the toxic by-
product. However, there have been suggestions that nuclear power may 
become an increasingly popular option to the extensive and increasing 
dependence on Russia.  
 What would be a viable policy for the EU to pursue in order to 
secure energy supply is to promote an increased interest in the 
‘neighbourhood’, or as Russia calls it, the ‘near abroad’. It would be 
strongly in European interests to encourage stability and increased 
involvement with these countries in order to potentially access alternative 
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sources of energy to Russia. However the problem is that countries such 
as Kazakhstan are landlocked, with virtually all oil exports travelling 
through Russia. If the EU was able to develop closer political and 
economic ties with the ‘neighbourhood’, then possibly it could also 
develop transport logistics of energy to the EU. As a response to such 
policies “Russia could react neurotically to EU meddling in what it sees 
as its backyard”17. In the face of an ever stronger Russia, with political 
ties between itself and EU on thin ice, especially with the 2006 October 
EU-Russia summit ending under less than desirable conditions, there is a 
need to try and diversify away from so much dependence from such an 
unstable country. 
 When drawing this section to a close, it is important to mention a 
couple of concluding points. What can be established at this point is the 
fact that Russia and the EU are most certainly highly dependent upon 
each other and that there would undoubtedly be costly effects in the 
domestic market in the short term if trade was stopped. There would most 
likely be costly effects upon policy change as well, which implies high 
levels of vulnerability and not just sensitivity of interdependence. 
However, one must keep in mind the fact that Russia is a relatively 
unstable country and has been previously known to try and influence its 
neighbours with energy politics, which has been increasingly seen in 
Eastern Europe. This has brought forward the need for the EU to try and 
diversify away from this increasing dependence on Russia. As it stands, 
there are at this point few alternatives to trying to develop closer relations 
with the ‘neighbourhood’, as other sources are geographically too distant, 
and the territories belonging to the EU happen to have extraordinarily 
scant natural fossil fuel resources in order to try and meet its own 
demand.  
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3 Trouble in Paradise? 
 
The Russia EU trade as well as political relationship has hardly been a 
smooth affiliation, especially concerning politics. Since the Second World 
War, there have been significant problems in terms of diplomacy as well 
as trade disputes. This troubled relationship has to a large extent included 
Eastern Europe, from the Cold War days of western criticism of human 
rights violations, to modern day EU and NATO enlargement. On the other 
hand, despite this Russia is an important trading partner, as was 
established in the previous chapter. Russia is also known to have close 
ties with certain member states such as Germany, especially in the 
aftermath of the Iraq war, and less so with countries like Estonia and 
Latvia. Many existing problems in the Russia-EU relationship will be 
touched upon in this chapter. They can be seen as factors contributing to 
diminished energy security in both the present and the future. A number 
of questions will be addressed in this section; How much can Russia 
produce in the future? How reliable is Russia? How does Russia conduct 
itself toward the EU? How do these problems affect EU energy security?  
 The first issue that needs to be considered is the security aspect; 
assessing Russia’s ability to supply energy in the future. Russia is known 
to be extracting oil from its producing oil fields at an astonishing speed, 
which has resulted in reserves depletion and encountering such poor 
conditions due to over-exploration that it becomes impossible to continue 
extracting. Russia has approximately 6% of world oil resources, 
compared to Saudi Arabia’s 22%, yet Russia was in 2005 the second 
largest oil producer in the world18. In 2003 Russia produced 11% of the 
world’s crude oil19. This implies serious over-consumption of oil, and as a 
result Russian oil reserves are predicted to last 21.4 years if extraction 
continues at its current rate20. On the other hand, these predictions need to 
be taken lightly as it is in reality highly unlikely that Russia will run out 
of fossil fuel resources, as new fields are constantly explored. Most 
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importantly, very large parts of northern Russia remain currently 
unexplored, and there are likely to be gargantuan oil and gas resources in 
this area. There have been time and again doomsday predictions of future 
oil supplies, this anxiety has been present since the 1880’s. The fact is 
that “global output has actually increased by 60 percent since the 1970’s, 
the last time the world was supposedly running out of oil”21. With regard 
to gas, Russia has 26.6% of world gas reserves at present, and this number 
is predicted to grow22. 
 The above argument has been widely discussed, and has been 
know to cause serious concern with regard to secure future supply from 
Russia. However, at this moment this concern does not seem highly valid. 
It is unlikely that energy producers, especially Russia, will end up running 
out of resources as there is so much unexplored ground. However, from a 
different aspect there is serious justified concern that Russia will be 
unable to fill demand of energy in future due to several reasons. The first 
of these is the fact that Russia has an incredibly energy intensive industry, 
and large sections of it are situated in the northern territories of Russia. 
The second issue that interrelates is that on top of this very energy 
intensive industry, the domestic oil prices are highly subsidised. They fail 
to reflect supply and demand relations, which has resulted in a 
considerable loss of potential revenue for the state, as well as hindering 
development23. As a result Russia consumes large percentages of its own 
energy, and to be able to meet external demand it buys energy from the 
‘near abroad’ and sells it at prevailing market prices. However, despite 
the ‘near abroad’, problematically enough Russia will most probably be 
unable to fill demand if it does not make domestic industry more efficient 
and liberalise domestic prices. Figure 324 serves to highlight the potential 
shortages of supply that the Russian gas exports may face.  
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The graph displays a fall in domestic supplies from 2004 to 2010, and this 
is very unlikely to be caused by a true shortage of reserves, but rather by 
over-exploration of oil wells and most importantly by a lack of 
investment into the industry. There is a desperate need for investment into 
the Russian oil and gas industry in order to maximise efficiency. Between 
2001 and 2030 the Russian gas industry will require a total investment of 
$330 billion and the oil sector will require $328 billion25. The state cannot 
afford this, the industry cannot re-inject money into investments and the 
state has significantly restricted foreign investment. This is a serious 
problem for the EU, as the future production possibility of the Russian 
energy industry is of crucial importance to energy security, as earlier 
established, there are few alternative producers. There are numerous 
foreign companies willing in to invest substantially in Russia, yet the state 
is reluctant to permit this. This problem will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 4.  
 
3.1 Distrust  
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, there are several problems in the 
EU-Russia relationship, one of which is a lack of trust. There have been a 
number of events which have been a cause for concern for the EU, when 
it has had to rely on Russia for energy security. Using energy as a weapon 
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is one of the foremost reasons for the EU to be apprehensive. This is most 
certainly not a new concept; however it has become increasingly evident 
over the years that Russia is not reluctant to use energy as a means of 
influence, given the opportunity. This became painfully clear to the 
European Union on January 1st 2006 when Russia cut gas supplies to the 
Ukraine. However, as was mentioned in the previous section, Russia has 
been using energy as a weapon against the eastern member states for 
years, yet Brussels has been reluctant to comment upon the events. The 
events on January 1st 2006 left Brussels with no choice but to make their 
opinion heard.  
 The gas flow disruption to Ukraine opened up the long feared 
possibility that Moscow might do the same to the EU, however there are 
some very important points to take into account in this instance. It has 
been showcased in the press that this act by Russia was a random exercise 
of power, however in fact it is very hard to argue that this is a real danger 
to the EU currently as the circumstances are very different. In 2005 
Ukraine paid $50 per 1000 cubic meters of Russian gas compared to the 
$240 the EU pays26. Belarus, to which Russia switched off the gas supply 
in 2004 February and January of this year, has been know for being 
notoriously late in paying for the significantly below market gas price. 
What can be gathered is the grim reality that Russia will continue to 
exercise its energy power if it afforded the opportunity. Moreover, the 
current situation is ideal, as these countries are highly dependent on 
inexpensive energy and at the same time owe a considerable amount in 
debt to Russia. What can be concluded is that in terms of this incident 
being a possible premonition of the EU-Russia energy relationship, there 
is a “need for planning and a certain amount of grim realism, but not for 
outright panic”27. The reality is that Russia has a great potential to be an 
unreliable partner, however, the kind of situation typified in CIS is very 
difficult to replicate as the EU pays market prices and does not owe 
Russia sky-high debts. It bears mention that Ukraine was also known to 
be siphoning off some significant amounts of gas to itself, therefore, in 
combination with the abovementioned factors, a serious reaction could be 
anticipated from Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine’s flirtation with NATO as 
well as EU, and their anti-Russian government failed to do any favours 
for the relationship.   
 Having now established that it is possible that the panic following 
the gas cuts in Ukraine was exaggerated, it is still important to keep it in 
mind as a valid risk. This becomes even more relevant as Germany 
continues to push forward the NordStream project - the anticipated gas 
pipeline traversing the Baltic sea from Russia to Germany. This ties 
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Germany and Russia economically and politically, and as many fear, it 
may also lead to Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom finding its way 
into the board rooms of German oil companies. The trepidation stems 
from the fact that Gazprom could potentially acquire a large enough share 
in German oil companies to be able to for example veto shipments to 
Poland. However, it is not very fruitful at this point to predict the future, 
but rather to give an idea of the concerns that are taking shape within 
Europe.  
 This pipeline is also an area of concern for the Nordic countries in 
addition to the Baltics. Sweden and Finland fear environmental damage as 
well as loss of potential revenue, and the Baltic States fear a loss of 
revenue from energy transit. However, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s 
alarm seems unjustified at present. Just because a gas pipeline is being 
built to Germany does not necessarily imply that the current pipelines 
running through the Baltics will be switched off. As stated in the 
beginning of the paper, the general rule tends to be that if there is money 
then trade will continue to take place. With the new pipeline Russia could 
sell even more. However, what should concern the Balitcs more at this 
point is that energy ties may very well be cut for other reasons, such as 
the redirection of most of Estonian transit oil as a result of the recent 
removal of the Bronze soldier in Tallinn.  
 The true problem that is brought forth within the discussion of 
NordStream and Russian use of energy as a weapon is that the EU does 
not act as a unified entity, but tends to rather have bilateral ties with 
member states. NordStream is in fact a very good example of member 
states, in this instance Germany, acting unilaterally. This situation has 
been seen time and again when Russia has bullied eastern member states 
with energy, and only a stony silence has echoed from Brussels. The end 
result of a non united energy policy toward Russia is not positive for the 
EU, as this only makes Russia stronger. The EU, being gravely concerned 
for future energy policy, would certainly gain by standing as a united 
actor against Russia.  
 The natural question that follows this line of argument is whether 
the EU needs a united energy policy in order to avoid the problem of 
battling Russian energy pressures. This situation has caused frictions 
within the EU as well, as certain eastern member states feel pressured and 
no response is obtained from Brussels. This has been a trend that has been 
noticed for some time, and needless to say, it is not beneficial for EU 
unity and further integration to be pushed apart by relations with the 
bigger neighbour.  
 When looking at the prospect of a common energy policy, it 
would most certainly be helpful for the EU to stand on a united front. 
However, there are several problems with this prospect. For one thing, the 
member states are still rather independent of the EU with regard to non 
economic questions. To have a common energy policy, there would have 
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to be some form of common foreign policy, which at this point seems 
very difficult to attain.  
 For another, having established EU’s Achilles’ heel as its non-
united stance and Russia’s affinity for using energy as a weapon towards 
Eastern Europe and the ‘neighbourhood’, there does not seem to be a 
reason for the EU to be too gravely concerned. It is highly unlikely that 
the EU will be affected in the manner that Ukraine or Belarus were. 
Russia is unlikely to switch of energy supplies to the EU, however, the 
EU will still be affected if the ‘neighbourhood’ is affected. If supplies are 
cut to Ukraine, the EU will be adversely affected as there will be a 
delivery shortage during the affected period. This is a reason for concern 
in energy security terms. If these sorts of power games by Russia 
continue, the EU should concern itself with securing supply, however, 
this kind of an action is not very likely at this point. On the other hand, it 
is difficult to predict, as recent events in Estonia showed that Russia was 
able to reroute 85% of transit within a day.  
 One final point needs to be highlighted in this context. Russia has 
not once during the last half century failed to deliver energy to Europe. 
Throughout the Cold War a reliable flow of supply came from the USSR, 
and later from Russia, to Europe. “Moscow has frequently pointed out, 
Russia has supplied Europe with gas without interruption for 40 years.. 
too little has been said about the part Ukraine played in the 
disagreement”28. Despite this fact, EU does still need to be concerned, as 
a third party, with the effects of supply cuts on transit states.  
 
3.2 Russia as a neo-merchant  
Over the last decades it has become increasingly clear that Russia is 
embracing a neo-mercantilism29 of sorts. The world has changed 
significantly since the Soviet era, as has inevitably the situation of Russia. 
There is certainly a case to be made for a Russian super-power complex 
as a result of these rapid ground breaking changes that have occurred. 
Rather than being the second half of the bi-polar power struggle, Russia is 
currently a country with a reasonably poor economy and oodles of 
transition problems. This has led to a situation of xenophobia and 
sensitivity toward the rest of the world, especially the West. This can be 
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very clearly seen in the Kremlin policies toward the energy sector, where 
foreign investors are being kept out of the loop of influence.  
 As a result of the abovementioned situation, the Russian view on 
energy security is very different to that of the West, where there has since 
the Coal and Steel Union existed a belief that security is an increasing 
interdependence upon each other. Russia on the other hand has adopted 
more of an attitude where it is happy to have other states increasingly 
dependent upon it, but would rather keep its own situation independent. 
This has been seen as the xenophobia of foreign investments, a fear of 
foreigners taking over natural resources in Russia, as involvements of this 
type would lead to diminished power for Russia. However, as has been 
discussed earlier, if no real investment is made into the energy industry, 
there is a real risk of an investment crisis.  
 This situation can turn out to be rather problematic in the long run 
for all parties concerned. Russia is being pressured politically and 
ideologically by the West, which is having an adverse effect on Russian-
Western relations. This situation could be potentially very dangerous from 
an energy security perspective as this might lead to a situation where 
Russia will seek alternative buyers of energy. However, the two buyers of 
EU’s calibre, China and India, are at this point not viable options for 
Russia. The second problem with pressuring Russia excessively is if the 
energy resources do start depleting to an alarming rate, with little hope for 
exploration of new fields. If this situation was to occur, there would be 
considerable competition for Russian resources, which may put the EU in 
an uncertain situation.  
 Before proceeding with a discussion of Russian risks, there is a 
need to mention some concluding points for this chapter. There are 
several problematic areas in the Russia-EU relationship which are a threat 
to energy security in the short and long term. Firstly, a discussion has 
been conducted on the sustainability of Russian energy resources in 
future. Pessimists claim there is only a finite amount of resources left, yet 
optimists claim that there is a large amount of unexplored resources. 
However, the immediate threat is still the impending investment crisis.  
 Secondly, there are considerable trust issues, which have been 
further advanced by situations such as the Ukraine gas cut in 2006. This 
problem has tended to spill over into intra-EU relations as well. And 
finally, what can be pinpointed as one of the main problems in the 
relationship is the view Russia has taken regarding energy security. 
Russia is acting like a neo-merchant, hoping to have states dependent 
upon its resources, yet it aims not to be dependent upon others. This is 
naturally neither realistic nor sustainable, and most of all has been a cause 
of concern for the EU.  
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4 What Does Russia Risk? 
 
As has been shown in the above section, Russia has tendencies to make 
the EU occasionally uneasy about energy security in relation to reliance 
on Russia. There are several different aspects that have been a cause for 
concern for the EU, which have been discussed above, and some of which 
will be looked at further detail below. It is important in this discussion of 
whether Russia is a secure source of energy, to address the question; what 
would Russia risk if it was to ‘misbehave’ toward the EU? There are 
several factors, which will be discussed below, which speak for a 
situation where it would be highly unlikely that Russia would be prepared 
to stop energy supplies to the EU.  
 Firstly, one of the most important things to keep in mind yet again 
is the fact that the EU is Russia’s biggest trading partner. The concept of 
“old friends are the best”30 seems to be upheld in this instance. The risk of 
meddling with a trade partner worth 52% of imports should be a risk too 
great to bear, along with the political implication of having broken ties 
with the EU.  
 Despite the occasional problematic relations the EU and Russia 
face, for Russia it is still important to keep close relations with certain EU 
member states. A prime example of this was the close relationship that 
was shaped in the build-up to the Iraq war with France and Germany. 
Germany is also an invaluable business partner for Russia with regard to 
the NordStream pipeline which is in planning stages currently, but will 
enable gas to flow directly to Germany, and will be a great source of 
income for Russia, without a middleman. This is a very important factor 
as Ukraine and other ‘near abroad’ countries are know to be siphoning off 
gas from the pipelines, and the Baltics and Central Eastern Europe take a 
substantial transit fee for handling the energy.  
 Secondly, good political relations with Europe, which result in 
good economic relations, is a beneficial situation for Moscow with regard 
to the United States as well. Relations between Washington and Moscow 
have been in a dire state for some time now. By having closer ties to the 
EU, Russia is able to firstly, better avoid unnecessary contact with 
Washington and its political pressures, as well as find solace behind EU 
when Washington is active. This situation has become increasingly true in 
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the past half decade as EU-US relations have deteriorated simultaneously 
with US-Russian relations. The Iraq war played a substantial role in this 
phenomenon, at the same time as splitting the EU states internally for and 
against the war.  
 From the economic cost point of view there is yet another 
argument to take into account. As earlier mentioned in this paper, energy 
is by far the biggest export commodity from Russia to the EU. If this was 
suddenly disrupted for some reason, the direct costs from the energy 
industry would be too large to bear for Russia. If energy supply was 
stopped, the oil industry would suffer unbelievable costs, as refineries 
would have to be shut down. Shutting down refineries for a short 
disruption would be incredibly expensive, and not only from the point of 
view of revenue loss from halted sales, but purely from cost of physically 
shutting down refineries. Nor would storing be a suitable option again due 
to cost. There is firstly, a lack of space to store the amounts of oil that are 
produced in a day. Secondly, it would be too expensive and impractical to 
try and build storage space in the event of a desired disruption. As far as 
oil is concerned, it would not be a worthy risk for Russia to disrupt supply 
for a short period of time. The only viable option would be to reroute 
supply, a problem which will be discussed in the following section. 
 With regard to gas, it is much easier to cut supply, by several 
methods, including exonerating a part of a pipeline. This would naturally 
also be rather costly, however less so than the abovementioned problems 
with dropping oil supply. Furthermore, with regard to cost of Russia 
cutting supply, there is one final point to take into account. Europe is an 
incredibly important market for Russia as it is the most profitable one, 
which pays strictly the highest prices per cubic metre of gas and per barrel 
of oil.  
 
4.1 Alternative buyers? 
Russia has been looking at the ‘Asian Tigers’31 in order to diversify its 
energy sales. This would be highly beneficial for Russia as it would make 
it a global rather than a regional supplier, however it would imply the 
redirection of energy supplies from Europe.  
 The two largest and most realistic options would be to supply 
India and China, which are both emerging markets of a substantial scale. 
Secondly, they are within a reasonable distance as opposed to USA or the 
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like. When looking at these markets in more detail, a certain number of 
issues arise. Firstly, China is a gargantuan market, and developing at an 
incredible rate, which will imply a marked rise in energy demand. It is a 
market with unlimited potential as energy importer. This could be an ideal 
alternative for Russia, were it not for certain issues. Firstly, China prefers 
to develop its own energy production, however it lacks oil. This is a 
reason why to a large extent it has decided to focus on gas production, in 
order to be self-sufficient to the largest extent possible32. Secondly, the 
estimates of China’s oil demand are currently misleading due to a highly 
uneven development among the regions within the country. It is very hard 
to at this point estimate what the real energy demand will be when 
comparing the development of Shanghai or Beijing to most of the country 
side. Finally, if Russia were to build a pipeline to its eastern border, in 
order to supply both China and Japan, the cost would be too large. There 
would be many thousands of miles of landmass to cover, and the climate 
is harsh in the eastern border, hence the sea mass would be frozen for 
parts of the year when the pipeline should be built. Simply put, at this 
point it is not economically viable for Russia to try to turn toward the 
East.  
 The Indian market, is also growing at an astonishing pace. It 
imports most of its oil from the Middle East, but has very little gas 
production in the domestic market, which would make it an appealing 
market with growth predicted to rise rapidly. The problem with this 
market on the other hand is in fact logistical. It is one of the hardest 
markets for Russia to access. Most importantly, India would most likely 
be willing to import gas, yet this would have to be transported by 
pipeline, due to lack of LNG facilities. The main problem is that Russia 
and India are separated by huge mountain ranges as well as unstable 
areas, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. It would be unsafe for the 
pipeline to be built there as well as the technical problems of building a 
pipeline across the Himalayas among others. What can be concluded is 
that in fact India and China would hold very little appeal for Russia as it 
stands, and one cannot stress enough the fact that the European market is 
the most profitable to sell to.  
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4.2 Safeguards against supply disruptions 
As has been established throughout the paper, there are certain 
reservations as to how reliable Russia is as an energy supplier. The EU 
has been conscious to try and identify certain safeguards to energy 
disruptions, however, these are not very successful, especially in the short 
term. When looking at the safeguards against short term supply 
disruptions, incentives such as desire to be reliable, political hindrance 
such as democracy, risk of losing revenue, need of constant revenue, need 
for outlet for energy, risk for badwill , dependence on the West, desire to 
take negative consequences and EU/NATO membership as protection33. 
When looking at these criteria, for short term supply disruptions, Russia 
will not be discouraged to stop supply in fear of the above consequences. 
In the short term, the need for an outlet, revenue loss, democratic 
pressures or dependence of the West are not effective. Russia will not be 
subjected to serious harm in this regard for short supply disruption. “The 
barriers (Russia’s need for export revenues, transit dependence and risks 
of destroyed reputation etc) against short and partial supply disruptions 
are weak”34. However, one has to keep in mind with regard to having an 
oil outlet, the supply disruption needs to be incredibly short, as was earlier 
established, oil is very expensive to store, even in the short term.  
 The democratic incentive is not relevant in the case of long or 
short disruptions as politically there are few democratic pressures and 
values to uphold in the face of society and the country. The only incentive 
for Russia in the long and short term to continue supply is the aspect of 
reliability. Russia has for years been trying to clarify its image and 
reputation, and a long or short term supply disruption would have 
catastrophic future consequences if Russia wants to keep its reputation of 
reliability. Nevertheless, this does not appear to be a very significant 
barrier for Russia at this point.  
 Following the above discussion, it is still impossible to determine 
how large the risk for future disruptions is at this point. It can be assumed 
that there could be a risk for future disruptions in the event of a serious 
break of relations. In any other event a disruption is highly unlikely. 
Secondly, in the event of a break of relations, a supply disruption is much 
more likely toward the Former Soviet Union (FSU) states rather than west 
European states. “Russia appears to see certain European states affordable 
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collateral damage”35. A clear example of this is the energy pressure put on 
Eastern Europe, and especially the recent events in Estonia. Furthermore, 
a disruption of supply to a group of states such as the EU is also 
improbable. This would involve too grave consequences both 
economically as well as politically. Nevertheless, it is clearly possible, 
following the events in Estonia, that energy supply may be rerouted.  
 What can be gathered as one of the fundamental problems with 
regard to Russia and its energy power, and European dependence upon it, 
is the fact that it will not play by the same rules as other states do. Russia 
has been known to ignore criticism and is unwilling to change its 
behaviour. “The core problem is the combination of Russia’s perception, 
intentions, capabilities and track record along with lack of real stability, a 
high degree of unpredictability and a development away from democracy, 
rule of law and market norms”36.  
 Before proceeding to the next section it is important to mention 
some concluding points. Russia has a considerable amount to lose if it 
chooses to cut supplies to the European Union, yet what has been 
established in this chapter is the fact that Russia has determined it can 
afford certain losses and might determine that some economic losses may 
be worth the political statement. With regard to risks, if Russia was to cut 
supply to the EU, it would upset its biggest trade partner, to which it 
exports most, and imports from most. Secondly, as it stands it is not 
economically viable for Russia to try and turn to alternative markets such 
as China or India due to logistical problems as well as profit 
maximisation. Finally, what has also been established is that the 
safeguards against short term supply disruptions from Russia are very 
low. What can be concluded from this information is the fact that the EU 
is a crucial trading partner for Russia, yet its dependence upon Russia 
makes Russia a powerful partner in the short term. There are naturally 
low incentives for Russia to enhance scepticism about its reliability as a 
trading partner, yet what is also evident is that there is little the EU could 
really do if a short disruption took place. However, as it stands it is highly 
unlikely that Russia would choose to cause a supply disruption to a group 
of countries such as the EU, but rather a possible disruption to one single 
state, which would most likely be an FSU state. This has been witnessed 
in Estonia recently, and has previously been witnessed among the East 
European states.  
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5 Who Sits in the Kremlin? 
 
This final section is dedicated to addressing the question the role of the 
Kremlin, and who is the leader? What implications does this have on 
energy policy? This is particularly important in Russia, as during the past 
years the involvement of the state in the energy sector has caused 
significant uproar within and outside of Russia. The Russian president is a 
very powerful position which would insinuate that the leader might play a 
role in energy policies. A significant shift can be seen in energy policies 
when comparing the leadership periods of Putin and Yeltsin. Yeltsin was 
known for liberalism, and at times too much of it, where as Putin has 
taken hold of the energy sector, and processed many of the oligarchs who 
arose in the Yeltsin era. This section will be taking into account the 
adjustments that have taken place under Putin, such as xenophobia of 
foreign investment, hard line against oligarchs and increased roles of state 
owned Gazprom and Transneft. This section will question how the 
abovementioned adjustments will affect the EU and its energy supply. 
  
5.1 Taming the Oligarchs  
At the time Putin rose to power, Russia was in considerable disarray, with 
marked differences between rich and poor as well as wide spread 
lawlessness. This has been handled by Putin over his seven years in 
power by different means and it is questionable how successful his 
policies have been. The energy sector saw some large transformations at 
this time, especially with an increasing role of state owned Gazprom and 
Transneft, and bold tax claims being presented to the oligarchs. The most 
famous of these examples has naturally been the Yukos affair. The 
Russian state has tried to tame the oligarchs with arrests due to back 
taxes, however, most of the threatened ones left, with the exception of 
Khodarkovsky, who involved himself in politics, and remained in the 
country as a political statement. The Yukos affair has been a milestone 
not only because Khodarkovsky was imprisoned for a minimum of eight 
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years, with rumours of continuous harassment under detention, and Yukos 
bankrupted, but also because it changed the Russian energy industry37.  
 The Yukos assets were auctioned off, and Roseneft, the state-
owned oil company, was the one to quickly buy it below market price. 
The result has been that the state sector has been gaining increasing 
energy resources, including Yukos’ Yuganskgazneft, one of the biggest 
oil fields. The result has been increasing state domination of the energy 
sector. “The Kremlin, not the private sector, has become the key decision 
maker in licensing oil fields, determining the location of pipelines, and 
approving consortia for production and transportation.”38 For the ones 
who were expecting Russia to continue to liberalise and develop, this may 
have been an unwelcome turn as it seemed to take a step backward rather 
than forward.  
 The EU is also affected by this type of environment in the Russian 
Federation. It is dangerous from a dependency perspective to rely on a 
market that is increasingly state controlled by non transparent forces. 
Secondly, an open market environment can on most occasions guarantee 
trade as long as there are finances. However, a sector that is this strongly 
controlled by the state is directly dangerous to the EU if there is a serious 
break in relations, which could result in supply disruptions.  
 Increased state control has also a negative impact on the 
investment climate. Events such as Khodorkovsky’s arrest and numerous 
other oligarchs that were forced to leave the country to avoid arrest have 
an adverse effect on the investment climate. This is a less than wise move 
on behalf of the state, as has earlier been established; there is an 
increasing need for investment in the energy sector. However, the 
investment climate is plagued by other predicaments as well, but these 
will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
 Finally, as the state has imbedded itself deeper into the energy 
industry there is also less transparency. The Russian state is not known 
for being democratic and transparent, and this transforms the energy 
industry into a closed sector. This is again very harmful for the 
investment climate.  
 
5.2 Xenophobia of foreign investment 
With the increased control of the energy sector there is a distinct 
xenophobia of foreign investment. This poses a conundrum of how the 
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energy sector upgrades and maintenance will be financed if investment is 
limited from abroad, and it has become painfully clear that within Russia 
there is a deficiency of funds for this purpose.  
 In February 2005, the Minister of Natural Resources stated foreign 
firms should not be allowed to bid for natural resource projects of any 
type, however this was retracted in April and more of the market was 
opened39.  At the end of 2005, Gazprom shares were liberalised, however, 
the state maintained 51% ownership. Yet the Kremlin decided to exclude 
all foreign investors in October 2006 from the Shtokman natural gas 
project40. Despite the partial liberalisation of the market, there are still 
significant constraints on opportunities for foreign investors. As it stands, 
foreign companies are unable to own more than 50% minus one share in 
Russian energy companies41. There is also a preference of natural 
resource exploration licences being granted to state owned Gazprom and 
Rosneft rather than private or foreign companies. In the gas sector, 
Gazprom, which has a 90% gas sector monopoly, “limits upstream gas 
investments and third party access to its gas lines by independent gas 
producers and oil companies”42. 
 To date there has only been one successful Russian-Foreign 
merger in the energy sector which is the TNK-BP merger. This is not a 
desirable situation for the Russian state as it gives exclusive information 
on energy reserves to foreigners, which in fact means foreign access to 
state secrets. Successful mergers are rare for this exact reason, it is not 
desirable for the state to have foreign companies privy to such 
information. Foreign companies are also subject to very high taxation if 
they are able to enter into the Russian energy market.  
 There are numerous foreign companies that have lower shares in 
certain energy companies, and feel they have been cheated as they cannot 
gain control of the company despite significant investments. However, 
despite all of the obstacles and discontent, foreign investors are still keen, 
if given the opportunity, to break into the energy market in Russia as the 
possibility of profits are too high to leave unexplored.   
 The obvious problem that can be identified is the desperate need 
for investment in the energy sector, yet there are obstructions for foreign 
investors. As has been continuously highlighted in this paper, Russia 
needs substantial investments. This is a dangerous situation for the EU in 
terms of energy security, as declining infrastructure will result in 
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declining output, which is a danger for future energy supply. This 
impending investment crisis is a serious concern for the EU as it 
continues to depend on Russian energy at an increasing rate.  
 Russian protectionism of its energy sector as well as increased 
state control of it will have wider implications for the Russian economy. 
This sort of control will affect growth of the Russian economy negatively 
as well as create inefficiency. It has been proven through history, 
particularly in the USSR, that a state controlled energy industry is highly 
inefficient. It is extremely harmful for Russia, as the only recorded 
successful development in the energy industry took place between 1999 
and 200443. This successful development took place in companies that 
had been privatized and restructured. This should be an incentive for the 
Kremlin to liberalise the market.  
 The lack of democratic development plays into this factor as well. 
The EU should be gravely concerned about this aspect as an open market 
is their prime interest. Secondly, a lack of democratic development makes 
Russia less stable which is yet again a threat in terms of energy security.  
 The reason for the xenophobia of foreign investment can be 
analysed from a theoretical perspective. Celeste A. Wallander has 
described Russia as a Transimperialist44 country, meaning it is 
transnationalist as well as imperialist. This analysis has taken into account 
Russian foreign policy in a globalized strategic context and the nature of 
the authoritarian political-economic system under Putin, which very often 
uses energy for leverage. Russia is known to use energy as a weapon, as 
has been seen in the ‘near abroad’, and currently is powered by very high 
energy prices. However, being powered by high energy prices is not 
necessarily a negative situation as, this can “fuel growth in new supplies 
by significantly increasing investment and by turning marginal 
opportunities into commercial prospects”45. This could be an even more 
profitable situation if the energy sector would be subject to less state 
control.  
 Russian society is a patrimonial society, where the primary 
relationship in society is between patron and client. This is the 
explanation for the xenophobia of foreign investors and NGO’s, as they 
would undermine the patron-client relationship. An introduction of 
foreign companies and NGO’s would imply democratisation pressures 
which would serve to undermine the patron-client relationship. The 
“patron-client relationships are dependent on control and distribution of 
“rents,” wealth created not by productive economic activity but by the 
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political manipulation of economic exchange”46. According to this 
analysis the actions of the Russian state are logical, and any form of 
reform would undermine the powerbase in society. By this logic, the only 
way for the EU to try and secure its energy supply would be to promote 
democratisation in Russia. However, attempts to date have been 
unsuccessful.  
 The Kremlin is a very important factor in Russian energy policy. 
As has been witnessed over the past sixteen years, there is also a grave 
importance placed upon who sits in the Kremlin and makes energy policy. 
This is important as the position of the President of the Russian 
Federation is a very powerful one with significant influence over most 
policy sectors. It has been seen that during Putin’s second term, energy 
policy has become increasingly stringent and xenophobic. The state has 
resumed control of the energy sector, which has been proven through 
history to be an inefficient policy approach.  
 This increased control has also reflected negatively upon Russia’s 
reputation internationally, and has caused concern for the European 
Union.  Firstly, the increased state control of the energy sector is a cause 
for concern as it makes energy trade increasingly dependent upon sound 
political relations. Secondly, due to stringent policies upon foreign 
investment and ownership of Russian energy companies, there is an 
increased concern for the impending investment crisis. If substantial 
investment is not made into energy infrastructure, there will be a 
predicted drop in possible future exports. The problem is that “the 
Kremlin wants to encourage foreign companies to invest capital, 
knowledge and technologies in exchange for minor ownership, however, 
it still would want to retain direct ownership control”47. Finally, this sort 
of energy policy will affect growth of the Russian economy adversely 
resulting further concerns for energy security. The EU can only respond 
to this with democratisation pressures at this point. However, it is difficult 
to predict the future, as there are scheduled presidential elections in 
Russia next year, which might result in a more favourable leader? This, 
however, is a very unpredictable path as well.  
                                                                                                                                           
 
46 Wallander, Celeste A., 2007. “Russian Transimperialism and its Implications” The 
Washington Quarterly vol 30 issue 2 p. 116 
47   Milov, Vladimir, 2005. “Russian energy sector and it’s international implication” 
Institute of Energy Policy, Discussion Paper p. 14 
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6 Conclusion 
Energy security was a term coined by Reagan in 1973 following the 
second oil crisis. There are various definitions for it depending on 
perspective, either from the supply or the demand side. What can be 
established when looking at the energy relationship between the EU and 
Russia is the fact that the understanding of the term varies significantly 
between the two. For the EU energy security is interdependence, and for 
Russia it is neo-merchantilism. This definition discrepancy is a cause for 
concern in the energy relationship, as Russia is reluctant to play by the 
same rules at other states do48. Using energy as a weapon is a principal 
concern in this instance. 
 However a point of primary importance is that the EU and Russia 
are interdependent, with considerable sensitivity and vulnerability, which 
leaves limited leeway for unreliability. Trade between EU and Russia is 
of a considerable percentage for both. For the EU, Russia is a main 
energy supplier, especially with regard to gas, which is a key import with 
a large potential to grow. From a Russian perspective the EU is the source 
of 52% of all Russian imports. An interdependent relationship of such a 
nature could presume a pragmatic and reliable trade liaison.  
 There are however numerous concerns despite the clear economic 
dependence. Firstly, despite the fact that Russia is deemed politically 
more reliable than some OPEC countries, it still a relatively unstable 
state. This is a concern for the EU as this implies an increased importance 
being placed upon political relations rather than economic benefits. 
Secondly, there are issues surrounding future Russian production ability 
due to a dire need for investment in the energy sector. This is a genuine 
concern that may result in decreased future supplies for the EU if energy 
infrastructure in Russia is not improved. The viable option for the EU to 
guarantee future energy security would be to improve relations with the 
‘neighbourhood’, in order to potentially acquire direct deliveries from the 
area, by investing in infrastructure that bypasses Russian territory. Gas 
suppliers located further away are not a realistic option without 
development of LNG facilities. 
 The second option for the EU would be to increase pressure upon 
the Kremlin to open the energy market more for private and foreign 
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ownership rather than increased state control, in order to let market forces 
guide development. This approach has historically been much more 
efficient economically rather than state controlled energy sectors.  
 Finally, Russian use of energy as a weapon is yet another cause of 
apprehension on behalf of the EU. From a European energy security 
perspective it is not safe to have a large neighbour with such influence 
over surrounding states. The risk of intentional supply disruptions to the 
EU is very low, however, a gas disruption in one of the western CIS 
transit states (Commonwealth of Independent States) could affect the EU 
as a third party. Secondly, the risk of a supply disruption to a group of 
states, such as the EU, is also highly unlikely. More plausible is the 
scenario that there can be a disruption to a single state, as a result of 
powerful political turmoil.  
 This thesis has concluded that Russia is not the most reliable 
supplier for several reasons, yet there are limited options for the EU. 
There are no alternative preferable suppliers nearby, especially with 
regard to gas. It is highly unlikely that supply disruptions to the EU would 
take place, however it is important to be aware of the dangers as Russia is 
not a very stable country. It is important for the EU to try to diversify 
suppliers and find alternative sources of energy to lower dependence on 
Russia and make supply more secure. There is however no need for 
outright panic as it seems highly unlikely that Russia can either run out of 
resources or cut supplies to the EU at this point. Security of supply in the 
long term is a different topic which is not possible to predict now, 
especially with regard to the looming presidential election in Russia.  
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